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UAV-Assisted Secure Communications in Terrestrial Cognitive Radio
Networks: Joint Power Control and 3D Trajectory Optimization
Phu X. Nguyen, Van-Dinh Nguyen, Hieu V. Nguyen, and Oh-Soon Shin
Abstract—This paper considers secure communications for
an underlay cognitive radio network (CRN) in the presence
of an external eavesdropper (Eve). The secrecy performance of
CRNs is usually limited by the primary receiver’s interference
power constraint. To overcome this issue, we propose to use
an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) as a friendly jammer to
interfere Eve in decoding the confidential message from the
secondary transmitter (ST). Our goal is to jointly optimize the
transmit power and UAV’s trajectory in the three-dimensional
(3D) space to maximize the average achievable secrecy rate of
the secondary system. The formulated optimization problem is
nonconvex due to the nonconvexity of the objective and non-
convexity of constraints, which is very challenging to solve. To
obtain a suboptimal but efficient solution to the problem, we first
transform the original problem into a more tractable form and
develop an iterative algorithm for its solution by leveraging the
inner approximation framework. We further extend the proposed
algorithm to the case of imperfect location information of Eve,
where the average worst-case secrecy rate is considered as the
objective function. Extensive numerical results are provided to
demonstrate the merits of the proposed algorithms over existing
approaches.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio networks, unmanned aerial
vehicles, inner approximation, trajectory optimization, physical
layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the rapidly increasing number of mobile devices
and multimedia services have made radio spectrum scarce
and expensive resource [2]–[4]. To exploit spectrum more
efficiently, cognitive radio has been widely considered as a
promising solution [5], which enables to learn the surrounding
context and to adjust the operating parameters, thereby adapt-
ing to changes of radio frequency environment. Accordingly,
secondary devices are allowed to use the licensed bands
simultaneously, making cognitive radio a potential approach
for future wireless networks. However, various malicious
wireless devices can also opportunistically access the licensed
spectrum, which might make cognitive radio networks (CRNs)
vulnerable [6]–[10]. For instance, when a secondary trans-
mitter (ST) transmits confidential messages to a secondary
receiver (SR), an external eavesdropper (Eve, also known
as a passive attacker) probably overhears and intercepts the
legitimate transmissions.
Traditionally, the complexity-based cryptography can be
effective when the computational ability of Eves is too re-
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stricted to decipher secret key. Nevertheless, Eve’s computing
power is evolving consistently, while a trust infrastructure
for guaranteeing confidential communications is expensive to
deploy. To overcome such challenges, physical-layer security
(PLS) has been introduced as a potential technique to prevent
eavesdropping without a secure cryptographic protocol [11],
[12]. The key idea of PLS is to exploit random characteris-
tics of the wireless channel to degrade the Eve’s decoding
capability. To make the PLS viable, jamming noise (JN) can
be embedded at the transmitter and transmitted along with the
information signals to degrade the channel quality of Eve [10],
[13], [14]. A large effort has been made to bring the PLS a step
closer to practice [15]–[18]. However, most of the conventional
JN-based schemes are based on the ground jammers at the
fixed locations, leading to several major challenges. First,
when jammers are set far away from Eves, the effect of JN
is significantly reduced, and thus the secrecy rate deteriorates.
Second, for JN to be effective, the legitimate transmitter needs
to be aware of the channel state information (CSI) between
itself and Eve. Since Eves are usually passive, it may not be
possible to obtain their instantaneous CSI. Finally, in CRNs,
the secrecy performance improvement of the secondary system
using JN may also affect the primary system; the interference
power to the primary receiver (PR) may exceed the predefined
threshold.
In recent years, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) has attracted
significant interest in many applications, such as agriculture,
traffic control, military, photography, and package delivery
[19]–[23]. PLS can benefit from the application of UAV as
well, by making UAV send a JN to Eves. Compared with the
on-ground jammer, there are two obvious advantages of UAV-
aided JN: i) Eve will undergo strong interference due to the
line-of-sight (LoS) dominated UAV-Eve channel; ii) A UAV
operating in the three-dimensional (3D) space at the altitude
of a few hundred meters is able to fly to an optimal location
to cause interference to the channel between ST and Eve by
emitting a friendly JN. Thus, it is expected that UAV-aided
JN can provide better secrecy performance as compared to
the conventional on-ground jamming.
A. Related Works
PLS of CRNs has been well studied recently, which dealt
with specific security risks due to the broadcasting nature of
the wireless transmission media [6]–[10], [24], [25]. In gen-
eral, these works mainly focused on secure communications
for the secondary system [6]–[9] and the primary system [24],
[25], where power control is an effective way to control the
interference, assuming that the CSI of the ST-PR links is
already known. In [10], a cooperative transmission strategy
2was proposed to maximize the minimum secrecy rate of the
secondary system while satisfying the minimum secrecy rate
achievable for the primary system. The common technique
used in the above works is to make JN and the desired
signal concurrently transmitted at the same transmitter (ST
or primary transmitter), which limits the effectiveness of JN.
The transmitter needs to be equipped with multiple antennas
to perform beamforming; otherwise the legitimate user must
have better channel condition than Eve, which is too optimistic
in practice.
The security performance of ground users in the presence
of a ground Eve is improved by using UAV as a mobile
relaying [26]. In this work, UAV is assumed to fly with a fixed
trajectory, leading to a suboptimal solution. In [27], a UAV is
used to transmit a friendly JN with the aim of interfering the
channel between ST and Eve, where the security performance
of UAV-to-ground communication is maximized by jointly
optimizing the UAV trajectory and the transmission power. The
authors in [28] proposed a cooperative jamming UAV to enable
confidential air-to-ground communications between a mobile
UAV and ground nodes, where the user scheduling, UAV’s
trajectory and the transmit power are jointly optimized to
maximize the minimum secrecy rate among ground nodes. In
general, the location information of Eves is assumed to be per-
fectly known [26]–[29]. A practical scenario was considered
in [30] in which the location information of Eves is unknown.
Notably, the trajectories of UAV in the 3D space were not
considered in [30], presumably due to the nonconvexity and
complexity of the constraints related to UAV mobility.
B. Main Contribution
In this paper, we study the PLS for CRNs, in which the
secure communication of secondary system is guaranteed by
using a UAV as a friendly jammer. UAV is controlled to move
in a period of time that consists of many intervals, called
time slots. Such a time slot is designed to be suitable with
the motion characteristics of UAV in the 3D space. We first
formulate the average achievable secrecy rate maximization
problem over all time slots, where UAV’s trajectory and power
allocation are jointly optimized under the transmit power
constraints, interference power at the PR caused by both
UAV and ST, and mobility capability of UAV. The formulated
problem is highly nonconvex due to strong coupling between
optimization variables, which makes hard find the globally
optimal solution. The methods used in [27]–[30] mainly utilize
the inner convex approximation to tackle subproblems. Herein,
each subproblem is a single variable optimization problem,
which is divided from the original optimization problem. Such
an approach often results in a slow convergence rate, and yet,
the convergence of these proposed heuristic method is not
theoretically guaranteed.
To the best of our knowledge, our earlier work in [1]
is the first work that aims at improving the secrecy rate
of the on-ground secondary system by using UAV-enabled
cooperative JN. Differently from [1], this paper considers the
following completely new issues: i) We aim at finding the
optimal trajectory of UAV in the 3D space instead of the two-
dimensional (2D) space, by jointly optimizing its altitude as
well as horizontal location; ii) Towards a realistic scenario,
the imperfect location information of Eve is also considered,
making the problem even more challenging to solve. As a
result, the main contributions of the paper are summarized as
follows.
• We propose a new model for PLS in CRNs to maximize
the average achievable secrecy rate of the secondary
system by exploiting UAV-enabled JN.
• We formulate a new optimization problem that jointly
optimizes the transmit power and UAV’s trajectory sub-
ject to the PR’s interference power constraint. We first
consider the perfect CSI, including Eve, to investigate
benefits of our new model, for which an efficient and
low-complexity algorithm is proposed. The key idea of
our approach is to transform the original nonconvex
problem into a more tractable form and then develop new
inner approximations (IAs) of nonconvex parts [31], [32],
which guarantees convergence at least to a locally optimal
solution.
• When the location information of Eve is imperfect and
Eve is assumed to be distributed in a circular region with
a given radius, we reformulate the optimization problem
by considering the worst-case secrecy rate. The main
difficulty of this problem comes from the rate function
of Eve, which is further shaped to have a set of convex
constraints by combining tools from IA framework and
S-procedure.
• Extensive numerical results are provided to demonstrate
that the proposed algorithms have low complexities, i.e.,
in terms of per-iteration computation and the number of
iterations, and to show great performance improvement
over existing schemes. Numerical results also confirm the
effectiveness of the proposed approach that optimizes the
altitude of Eve as well as the horizontal location.
C. Paper Organization and Notation
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
system model is introduced in Section II. The optimization
problems and the proposed algorithms under perfect and
imperfect location information of Eve are provided in Section
III and Section IV, respectively. Numerical results are given
in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
Notation: Bold lower and upper case letters denote vectors
and matrices, respectively. E{·} represents the expectation of
random variables. ∇ denotes the gradient of a function. The
superscript (·)T denotes the transpose of a matrix. A  0
indicates that A is a positive semidefinite matrix. 〈a,b〉 is
the inner product of two vectors a and b. ln(X) denotes the
natural logarithm of X .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Transmission Model
We consider an on-ground CRN consisting of an ST and an
SR in the presence of a PR and an Eve, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Herein, Eve endeavors to intercept and overhear the legitimate
transmission between ST and SR in the secondary network.
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ST/ SR: secondary transmitter/receiver
PR: primary receiver
Eve: eavesdropper
UAV: unmanned aerial vehicle
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Fig. 1. Illustration of a CRN with a UAV-aided JN and an external Eve.
In order to further enhance the PLS of CRN, we propose to
use UAV as a friendly jammer to degrade the eavesdropping
channel. Let us define the 3D space T , {(x, y, z)|x, y, z ∈
R}. The positions of ground nodes (ST, SR, PR and Eve)
in the 3D-space model are expressed as cST , (0, 0, 0),
cS , (xS, yS, zS), cP , (xP, yP, zP), and cE , (xE, yE, zE),
respectively. Herein, the SR, PR and Eve are located on the
ground, i.e., zS = zP = zE = 0.
The predefined time interval T of UAV is split into N
time slots of equal length, i.e., the duration of each time
slot is given as δt = T/N . Note that N must be large
enough to guarantee a small interval per time slot, such that in
each time slot the UAV’s location is almost unchanged. Thus,
we define the time-varying horizontal coordinate of UAV as
cU[n] , (xU [n] , yU [n] , zU [n]), ∀n ∈ N , {1, 2, · · · , N},
where the altitude of UAV is limited in the range hmin ≤
zU [n] ≤ hmax. The UAV is assumed to move from the initial
position cU[0] , (x0, y0, h0) to the final predefined position
cU[N+1] , (xf , yf , hf ). Furthermore, the maximum velocity
constraint can be formulated as ‖q¯′v(t)‖ ≤ Vmax, 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
where q¯′v(t) and Vmax are the derivative of the UAV’s position
with respect to t and the maximum speed of UAV, respectively.
Accordingly, for a small interval of time slot δt, the mobility
constraints of UAV can be expressed as
hmin ≤ zU [n] ≤ h
max, ∀n ∈ N , (1a)
fd(cU[n], cU[n− 1]) ≤ L
2
max, ∀n ∈ N , (1b)
fd(cU[N + 1], cU[N ]) = 0, (1c)
where Lmax , Vmaxδt and fd(a,b) , (xa−xb)2+(ya−yb)2+
(za − zb)2, with a , (xa, ya, za) and b , (xb, yb, zb) ∈ T .
B. Achievable Secrecy Rate
We assume that the air-to-ground channels are modeled as
LoS channels. The distances between UAV and ground nodes
are calculated as dUx[n] , fd(cx, cU[n]), for x ∈ {S, P, E}.
At the time slot n, the channel gains from the UAV to SR,
PR and Eve, denoted by gUS, gUP and gUE, respectively, can
be modeled according to the free-space path loss [22], [26]–
[30], i.e., gUx[n] = ρ0(dUx[n])
−2, where ρ0 is the channel
gain at the reference distance d0 = 1 m. The terrestrial
channels experience quasi-static independent Rayleigh fading.
Therefore, the channel gains of the links from the ST to SR,
PR and Eve, denoted by hSP, hSS and hSE, respectively, can be
expressed as hSx = ρ0(dSx)
−ϕψSx, where dSx , fd(cx, cST); ϕ
and ψSx are the path loss exponent and an exponential random
variable with unit mean, respectively.
The achievable rates at SR and Eve for decoding the
messages from ST at the time slot n can be expressed as [1],
[27]
RS[n] = EhSS
{
log2
(
1 +
pS[n]hSS
pU[n]gUS[n] + σ2
)}
, (2a)
RE [n] = EhSE
{
log2
(
1 +
pS[n]hSE
pU[n]gUE[n] + σ2
)}
, (2b)
where pS[n] and pU[n] are the transmit powers at the ST
and UAV, respectively, and σ2 is the power of additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN). For total N time slots, the average
achievable secrecy rate for the secondary system can be
expressed as [33]
Rsec ,
1
N
∑
n∈N
[
RS[n]−RE[n]
]+
, (3)
where [x]+ , max{0, x}.
III. PROPOSED ALGORITHM WITH PERFECT LOCATION
INFORMATION OF EAVESDROPPER
In this section, the Eve’s location information is assumed
to be perfectly known at the transmitters (ST and UAV). This
assumption is of interest in some scenarios. For instance, at
the beginning of the time interval, both SR and Eve perform
handshaking with ST by sending pilot signals. However, only
SR is scheduled to be served, while Eve is treated as an
untrusted user. In addition, the system performance under the
assumption of perfect location information of Eve will act as
an upper bound for the practical system, providing a reference
of the potential benefit of using UAV-aided JN.
A. Optimization Problem Formulation
In this paper, the key idea is to exploit the advantage of
UAV’s mobility in combination with developing an effective
power control scheme to enhance the security performance
of the secondary system while satisfying the transmit power
constraints and the PR’s interference power constraint. By
defining c , {cU[n]}n∈N and p , {pS[n], pU[n]}n∈N , the
secrecy rate maximization (SRM) problem for the secondary
system is formulated as follows:
P : max
c,p
Rsec (4a)
s.t. (1), (4b)
1
N
∑
n∈N
pU [n] ≤ P¯U, (4c)
0 ≤ pU [n] ≤ P
max
U , ∀n ∈ N , (4d)
1
N
∑
n∈N
pS [n] ≤ P¯S, (4e)
0 ≤ pS [n] ≤ P
max
S , ∀n ∈ N , (4f)
1
N
∑
n∈N
(EhSP {pS[n]hSP}+ pU[n]gUP[n]) ≤ ε. (4g)
4Constraints (4c) and (4d) are the average power and the peak
power constraints at UAV, respectively. The average power
and the peak power constraints at ST are stated by (4e) and
(4f), respectively. Herein, we assume that P¯S ≤ PmaxS and
P¯U ≤ PmaxU . To guarantee the quality of service (QoS) of the
primary system, the average power of aggregated interference
at PR is limited by a predefined threshold ε as in (4g).
It is not difficult to see that the objective function (4a) is
nonconcave and constraint (4g) is nonconvex. Strong cou-
pling between the optimization variables makes the problem
even more challenging to be tackled. Moreover, the objective
function may not be addressed directly due to the expectation
of the average achievable secrecy rate. In what follows, we
first transform problem (4) into a more tractable form by
bypassing the expectation functions with respect to the ground
channels. Then, a low-complexity iterative algorithm based on
IA framework is developed to solve the problem, which yields
at least a locally optimal solution.
B. Tractable Formulation for (4)
In the PLS, it is important to consider a safe design, taking
into account the effects of wireless channels. To do so, we
derive a lower bound of RS[n] and an upper bound of RE[n]
following the similar developments in [27].
Lower bound of RS[n]: Let X [n] ,
pS[n]hSS
pU[n]gUS[n] + σ2
.
Since hSS = ρ0(dSS)
−ϕψSS, we have X [n] =
pS[n]ρ0(dSS)
−ϕψSS
pU[n]gUS[n] + σ2
. It is true that X [n] is an
exponentially distributed random variable with parameter
λS[n] = d
ϕ
SS/
( pS[n]ρ0
pU[n]gUS[n] + σ2
)
. RS[n] in (2a) can be
rewritten as
RS[n] = EhSS
{
log2
(
1 +X [n]
)}
= EhSS
{
log2
(
1 + eln(X[n])
)}
. (5)
Since log2
(
1+ ex
)
is a convex function [34] and by Jensen’s
inequality, it follows that
RS[n] = EhSS
{
log2
(
1 + eln(X[n])
)}
≥ log2
(
1 + eEhSS{ln(X[n])}
)
, (6)
where EhSS
{
ln
(
X [n]
)}
is computed as
EhSS
{
ln
(
X [n]
)}
=
∫ ∞
0
ln
(
X [n]
)
λS[n]e
−λS[n]xdx
= − ln
(
λS[n]
)
−k, (7)
with k being the Euler constant. Substituting (7) into (6), we
get
RS [n] ≥ R
LB
S [n] , log2
(
1 +
e−kγ0d
−ϕ
SS pS [n]
γ0d
−2
US [n]pU[n] + 1
)
, (8)
where γ0 , ρ0/σ
2.
Upper bound of RE[n]: Since hSE = ρ0(dSE)
−ϕψSE, we have
Y [n] ,
pS[n]hSE
pU[n]gUE[n] + σ2
=
pS[n]ρ0(dSE)
−ϕψSE
pU[n]gUE[n] + σ2
. (9)
Similarly to X [n], Y [n] is also an exponentially
distributed random variable with parameter λE[n] =
dϕSE/
( pS[n]ρ0
pU[n]gUE[n] + σ2
)
. Given that log2
(
1+ y
)
is a concave
function in y [34], we obtain the following inequality using
Jensen’s inequality:
RE[n] = EhSE
{
log2
(
1 + Y [n]
)}
≤ log2
(
1 + EhSE{Y [n]}
)
= RUBE [n] , log2
(
1 +
γ0d
−ϕ
SE pS [n]
γ0d
−2
UE [n]pU[n] + 1
)
, (10)
where EhSE
{
ln(Y [n])
}
= 1/λE[n].
In addition, from the fact that EhSP {pS[n]hSP} =
ρ0d
−ϕ
SP pS[n], constraint (4g) can be further simplified as
1
N
∑
n∈N
(
ρ0d
−ϕ
SP pS[n] + ρ0d
−2
UP [n]pU[n]
)
≤ ε. (11)
Simply put, we consider the following safe optimization
problem:
P
Safe : max
c,p
RLBsec ,
1
N
∑
n∈N
(
RLBS [n]−R
UB
E [n]
)
(12a)
s.t. (1), (4c)− (4f), (11), (12b)
where the operation [x]+ is ignored since it does not affect
the optimal solution. If the objective function is less than zero
for any time slot, ST can reduce its transmit power of ST to
zero while satisfying constraint (11).
Remark 1. Note that problem (12) is considered as a safe
design in the sense that its solution is always feasible to
problem (4) but not vice versa due to the inequalities in (8)
and (10), i.e., Rsec ≥ R
LB
sec. In the rest of this paper, we
will consider the safe optimization problem (12) to provide a
lower bound of the average secrecy rate rather than the actual
secrecy rate in (4).
C. Proposed Iterative Algorithm for Solving (12)
We are now ready to apply IA method [31] to approx-
imate the nonconvex problem (12). Before proceeding fur-
ther, we first introduce new optimization variables r ,
{rS[n], rE[n]}n∈N to rewrite (12) equivalently as
P
Safe
Equi : max
c,p,r
RLBsec ,
1
N
∑
n∈N
(
rS[n]− rE[n]
)
(13a)
s.t. (1), (4c) − (4f), (11), (13b)
RLBS [n] ≥ rS[n], ∀n ∈ N , (13c)
RUBE [n] ≤ rE[n], ∀n ∈ N , (13d)
It can be readily seen that the objective (13a) is a linear
function of r. In problem (13), nonconvex parts include (11),
(13c) and (13d).
Convexity of (13c): By introducing slack variables zS [n]
and tS [n], (13c) is expressed as
(13c)⇔


RLBS [n] ≥ log2(1 + tS[n]) ≥ rS[n], (14a)
e−kγ0d
−ϕ
SS pS [n]
γ0α
−1
S [n] pU[n] + 1
≥ tS[n], (14b)
αS [n] ≤ fd(cS, cU[n]). (14c)
5We note that constraints (14a)-(14c) will hold with equality at
optimum, leading to an equivalence between (13c) and (14).
To avoid the implementation complexity of log function, we
apply the first-order approximation to approximate the concave
function log2(1+tS[n]) around the point t
(i)
S [n] [35, Eq. (66)],
and thus (14a) is iteratively approximated as
R
(i)
S [n] , a(t
(i)
S [n])−b(t
(i)
S [n])
1
tS[n]
≥ rS[n], ∀n ∈ N , (15)
where a(t
(i)
S [n]) , log2(1 + t
(i)
S [n]) + log2(e)
t
(i)
S [n]
t
(i)
S [n]+1
and
b(t
(i)
S [n]) , log2(e)
(t
(i)
S [n])
2
t
(i)
S [n]+1
. Next, we rewrite (14b) as
tS [n] (γ0pU [n] + αS [n]) ≤ e
−kγ0d
−ϕ
SS pS [n]αS [n] , (16)
and then apply the following inequality [16]:
xy ≤ 0.5
(y(i)
x(i)
x2 +
x(i)
y(i)
y2
)
, for x, y ∈ R+, x
(i), y(i) > 0,
to convexify (16) as
1
2
t
(i)
S [n]
γ0p
(i)
U [n] + α
(i)
S [n]
(γ0pU [n] + αS [n])
2+
1
2
γ0p
(i)
U [n] + α
(i)
S [n]
t
(i)
S [n]
t2S [n] +
e−kγ0d
−ϕ
SS
4
(pS [n]− αS [n])
2
≤
e−kγ0d
−ϕ
SS
4
(
(pS [n] + αS [n])
2
)
, ∀n ∈ N . (17)
For constraint (14c), we note that its right-hand side (RHS) is
a quadratic convex function which is useful to apply the first-
order approximation. Hence, (14c) can be iteratively replaced
by the following linear constraint:
αS [n] ≤ f
(i)
d (cU[n]|cS, c
(i)
U [n]), ∀n ∈ N , (18)
where f
(i)
d (cU[n]|cS, c
(i)
U [n]) is the first-order approximation of
fd(cS, cU[n]) around the point c
(i)
U [n], which is defined in (26).
It can be seen that (15), (17) and (18) are convex quadratic
and linear constraints [34].
Convexity of (13d): For new slack variables tE[n], αE[n] and
β[n], constraint (13d) can be rewritten equivalently as
(13d)⇔


RUBE [n] ≤ log2(1 + tE[n]) ≤ rE[n], (19a)
γ0d
−ϕ
SE pS [n]
β[n] + 1
≤ tE[n], (19b)
β [n] ≤
γ0pU [n]
αE [n]
, (19c)
fd(cE, cU[n]) ≤ αE [n] . (19d)
In (19), except for (19d), other constraints still remain non-
convex. Since log2(1 + tE[n]) is a concave function, (19a) is
iteratively replaced by
R
(i)
E [n] , log2(1 + t
(i)
E [n]) +
log2(e)(tE[n]− t
(i)
E [n])
1 + t
(i)
E [n]
≤ rE[n], ∀n ∈ N , (20)
which is a linear constraint. Similarly to (17), constraint (19b)
is approximated around the feasible point (p
(i)
S [n], β
(i)[n]) as
γ0d
−ϕ
SE
2
( p2S[n]
p
(i)
S [n](β
(i)[n] + 1)
+
p
(i)
S [n](β
(i)[n] + 1)
(β[n] + 1)2
)
≤ tE[n],
which can be cast to the following convex constraint:
γ0d
−ϕ
SE
2
( p2S[n]
p
(i)
S [n](β
(i)[n] + 1)
+
p
(i)
S [n]
2β[n]− β(i)[n] + 1
)
≤ tE[n], ∀n ∈ N . (21)
In (21), the lower bound of (β[n] + 1)2 is given as (β(i)[n] +
1)(2β[n]−β(i)[n]+ 1) over the trust region 2β[n]−β(i)[n]+
1 > 0. Constraint (19c) is rewritten as αE [n]β [n] ≤ γ0pU [n]
and in the same manner as (17), we have
1
2
(β(i) [n]
α
(i)
E [n]
α2E [n] +
α
(i)
E [n]
β(i) [n]
β2 [n]
)
≤ γ0pU [n] , ∀n ∈ N .
(22)
Convexity of (11): We first reformulate (11) as
(11)⇔


1
N
∑
n∈N
(
ρ0d
−ϕ
SP pS[n] + ρ0
pU[n]
αP[n]
)
≤ ε, (23a)
αP [n] ≤ fd(cP, cU[n]) (23b)
where αP[n], ∀n are slack variables. Similarly to (21), con-
straint (23a) is iteratively approximated as
1
N
∑
n∈N
(
ρ0d
−ϕ
SP pS[n] +
ρ0
2
[ p2U[n]
p
(i)
U [n]α
(i)
P [n]
+
p
(i)
U [n]
2αP[n]− α
(i)
P [n]
])
≤ ε. (24)
For a given point a = (xa, ya, za) ∈ T and optimization
variable b = (xb, yb, zb) ∈ T , constraint (23b) is innerly
approximated as
αP [n] ≤ fd(cP, c
(i)
U [n]) + fg(cU[n]|cP, c
(i)
U [n])
, f
(i)
d (cU[n]|cP, c
(i)
U [n]), ∀n ∈ N , (25)
where
fg
(
b|a,b(i)
)
,
〈
∇fd(a,b),b − b
(i)
〉
=

∇xfd(a,b)∇yfd(a,b)
∇zfd(a,b)


T

xb − x
(i)
b
yb − y
(i)
b
zb − z
(i)
b


= 2(x
(i)
b − xa)(xb − x
(i)
b )
+ 2(y
(i)
b − ya)(yb − y
(i)
b )
+ 2(z
(i)
b − za)(zb − z
(i)
b ), (26)
with ∇xfd(a,b), ∇yfd(a,b), and ∇zfd(a,b) being the gra-
dients of fd(a,b) with respect to xb, yb, and zb, respectively.
In other words, f
(i)
d (cU[n]|cP, c
(i)
U [n]) is the first-order approx-
imation of fd(cP, cU[n]) around the point c
(i)
U [n].
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Fig. 2. Illustration of a CRN with a UAV-aided JN and an external Eve
under imperfect location information of Eve.
Bearing all the above developments in mind, the successive
convex program solved at iteration i is given as
P
Safe
Convex : maxc,p,r
t,α,β
RLB,(i)sec ,
1
N
∑
n∈N
(
rS[n]− rE[n]
)
(27a)
s.t. (1), (4c)− (4f), (24), (25), (15),
(17), (18), (19d), (20), (21), (22), (27b)
where t , {tS[n], tE[n]}n∈N , α , {αP[n], αS[n], αE[n]}n∈N ,
and β , {β[n]}n∈N . Let Ψ , {c,p, r, t,α,β} and Ψ
(i)
,
{c(i),p(i), r(i), t(i),α(i),β(i)} be the sets of optimization
variables and parameters that need to be updated at iteration
i. To ensure that the approximate convex program (27) can be
successfully solve at the first iteration, a feasible starting point
Ψ(0) must be initialized. We then find the optimal solution
of (12) by successively solving (27) and updating involved
variables until meeting the convergence criterion. In summary,
a pseudo-code for solving (12) is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Proposed Algorithm for Solving (12)
1: Initialization: Set i := 0 and generate an initial feasible
point Ψ(0) satisfying (27b).
2: repeat
3: Set i := i+ 1;
4: Find the optimal solution Ψ(∗) by solving (27);
5: Update Ψ(i) := Ψ(∗);
6: until
R
LB,(i)
sec −R
LB,(i−1)
sec
R
LB,(i−1)
sec
≤ ǫtol.
Complexity Analysis: The optimization problem (27) has
13N real variables and 16N constraints. The per-iteration
complexity of Algorithm 1 required to solve (27) is thus
O((16N)2.5(13N)2 + (16N)3.5).
IV. EXTENSION TO THE CASE OF IMPERFECT LOCATION
INFORMATION OF EAVESDROPPER
In practice, perfect information on the location of Eve may
be difficult to obtain in some cases. For example, Eve can
move to new locations (e.g., closer to the ST) to overhear
confidential messages from ST more effectively. As a result,
the location of Eve may change, and thus, it can only be
estimated by ST and UAV based on its last known location.
Moreover, the active region of Eve may be restricted, and Eve
may not be allowed to move inside the safe zone of the ST.
As illustrated in Fig. 2, the location estimate for Eve can
be expressed as cˆE = (xˆE, yˆE, zˆE = 0). We consider the
same optimization problem setup as in Section III, with the
additional assumption that the location information of Eve is
imperfect. To put it into context, let
xE = xˆE +∆xE, (28a)
yE = yˆE +∆yE, (28b)
zE = zˆE = 0, (28c)
where ∆xE and ∆yE represent the associated estimation errors
of xE and yE, respectively. We should note that the transmitters
are only aware of cˆE, while the estimation errors∆xE and∆yE
are assumed to be deterministic and bounded, satisfying the
following condition [18], [30]:
(∆xE,∆yE) ∈ Ξ , {(∆xE,∆yE)|∆x
2
E +∆y
2
E ≤ Q
2}, (29)
where Q > 0 is the maximum distance between the estimate
and exact location of Eve.
A. Worst-Case Optimization Problem Formulation
Toward a safe design, the worst-case secrecy rate is consid-
ered. We first introduce the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Consider that the location estimation error of Eve
is deterministic and bounded: (∆xE,∆yE) ∈ Ξ. By utilizing
the tractable form in Section III-B, we formulate the worst-
case secrecy rate of the secondary system [18] at time slot n
as
R¯sec[n] = R
LB
S [n]− max
(∆xE,∆yE)∈Ξ
RUBE (dˆSE, dˆUE [n]), (30)
where RLBS [n] is given in (8); R
UB
E (dˆSE, dˆUE [n]) is a function of
(dˆSE, dˆUE [n]), instead of (dSE, dUE [n]) in (10). For a tractable
form, the worst-case secrecy rate in (30) is further transformed
into a “strict” worst-case secrecy rate:
Rˆsec[n] = R
LB
S [n]− max
(∆xE,∆yE)∈Ξ
RˆUBE [n] , (31)
where
RˆUBE [n] , R
UB
E [n]
(
d¨SE, dˆUE[n]
)
= sup
dˆSE∈D
RUBE [n]
(
dˆSE, dˆUE[n]
)
,
with D being the set of distances from ST to Eve. As il-
lustrated in Fig. 3, a fixed distance d¨SE is determined by
d¨SE = fd(c¨E, cST), where c¨E is the nearest geometric point
such that c¨E ∈ {cˆE + (∆xE,∆yE, 0)|(∆xE,∆yE) ∈ Ξ}.
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
It can be foreseen that this analysis can further reduce the
complexity of the optimization problem, since dˆSE is replaced
by d¨SE. Nevertheless, the property of the worst-case secrecy
rate over the set of (∆x,∆y) would be strictly remained when
addressing dˆUE[n]. Based on the developments presented in
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Fig. 3. The possible location of Eve in the “strict” worst-case optimization
problem.
Section III-B, we formulate the strict average worst-case SRM
(WC-SRM) problem of CRN as follows:
P^
Safe : max
c,p
RˆLBsec ,
1
N
∑
n∈N
Rˆsec[n] (32a)
s.t. (1), (4c)− (4f), (11). (32b)
It can be seen that (13) and (32) have similar structure and the
same set of constraints. However, the objective function of (32)
is more complex due to joint optimization under estimation
errors, making the problem even more challenging to solve.
B. Proposed Iterative Algorithm for Solving (32)
In this section, we reuse all the slack optimization variables
introduced in Section III. By following the same steps pre-
sented in Section III-C, we arrive at the following safe and
approximate optimization problem for the WC-SRM (32):
P^
Safe
Appr : maxc,p,r
tS,αPS
RˆLBsec ,
1
N
∑
n∈N
(
rS[n]− rE[n]
)
(33a)
s.t. (1), (4c)− (4f), (15), (17), (18), (24), (25), (33b)
max
(∆xE,∆yE)∈Ξ
RˆUBE [n] ≤ rE[n], ∀n ∈ N , (33c)
where tS , {tS[n]}n∈N and αPS , {αP[n], αS[n]}n∈N . In
(33), the objective is already linear function while all the
constraints are convex, excepting for (33c).
Convexity of (33c): Similarly to (19), it follows that
(33c)⇔


RˆUBE [n] ≤ log2(1 + tE[n]) ≤ rE[n], (34a)
γ0d¨
−ϕ
SE pS [n]
β[n] + 1
≤ tE[n], (34b)
β [n] ≤
γ0pU [n]
αE [n]
, (34c)
max
(∆xE,∆yE)∈Ξ
fd(cˆE + (∆xE,∆yE, 0), cU[n])
≤ αE [n] . (34d)
Constraints (34a) and (34c) are tackled as the same steps in
(19a) and (19c), respectively; (34b) can be convexified by
replacing dSE in (19b) with d¨SE as
γ0d¨
−ϕ
SE
2
( p2S[n]
p
(i)
S [n](β
(i)[n] + 1)
+
p
(i)
S [n]
2β[n]− β(i)[n] + 1
)
≤ tE[n], ∀n ∈ N . (35)
Since Ξ is a continuous set of estimation errors, enumerating
all the possible cases of (∆x,∆y) is obviously impossible. To
overcome this issue, we first reformulate (34d) as follows:
(34d)⇔
{
∆x2E +∆y
2
E ≤ Q
2, (36a)
fd(cˆE + (∆xE,∆yE, 0), cU[n]) ≤ αE [n] . (36b)
To address the nonconvex constraint (36), we introduce the
following lemma.
Lemma 2. By applying S-procedure and Schur’s complement
[34], (36) is transformed into the following convex constraints:
fd(cˆE, cU[n])− αE[n] ≤ θE[n], ∀n ∈ N , (37a)
µ[n] ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N , (37b)
S[n]  0, ∀n ∈ N , (37c)
where θ , {θE[n]}n∈N and µ , {µ[n]}n∈N are slack
variables, and
S[n] ,

 µ[n]− 1 0 xU[n]− xˆE0 µ[n]− 1 yU[n]− yˆE
xU[n]− xˆE yU[n]− yˆE −Q2µ[n]− θE[n]

 .
Proof: Please see Appendix B.
As summarized in Algorithm 2, the solution of the WC-
SRM problem (32) can be found by successively solving a
safe and convex program, of which the approximated problem
at iteration i+ 1 is expressed as
P^
Safe
Convex : max
Ψˆ
RˆLB,(i)sec ,
1
N
∑
n∈N
(
rS[n]− rE[n]
)
(38a)
s.t. (1), (4c)− (4f), (15), (17), (18),
(20), (22), (24), (25), (35), (37), (38b)
where Ψˆ , {c,p, r, t,α,β, θ,µ}, which correspondingly
provides Ψˆ
(i)
, {c(i),p(i), r(i), t(i),α(i), β(i), θ(i),µ(i)} as
the optimal solution for (38) at iteration i.
Algorithm 2 Proposed Algorithm for Solving (32)
1: Initialization: Set i := 0 and generate an initial feasible
point Ψˆ
(0)
satisfying (38b).
2: repeat
3: Set i := i + 1;
4: Find the optimal solution Ψˆ
(∗)
by solving (38);
5: Update Ψˆ
(i)
= Ψˆ
(i−1)
;
6: until
Rˆ
LB,(i)
sec − Rˆ
LB,(i−1)
sec
Rˆ
LB,(i−1)
sec
≤ ǫtol.
Complexity Analysis: The optimization problem (38) has
15N real variables and 18N constraints. The complexity
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SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
System bandwidth 10 MHz
Path loss exponent, ϕ 3
Number of time slots, N 500
Channel gain at the reference distance, ρ0 10 dB
Power budget at ST, PmaxS 40 dBm
Average power limit at ST, P¯S PmaxS /2
Power budget at UAV, PmaxU 4 dBm
Average power limit at UAV, P¯U PmaxU /2
Maximum and minimum altitudes of UAV, (hmax, hmin) (150, 50) m
Maximum speed of UAV, Vmax 10 m/s
Average interference power threshold at PR, ε -20 dBm
Noise power, σ2 -70 dBm
Error tolerance threshold, ǫtol 10−4
required to solve (38) in each iteration of Algorithm 2 is
O((18N)2.5(15N)2 + (18N)3.5).
C. Convergence Analysis of Algorithms 1 and 2
We can see that the objective values in (27a) and (38a)
are non-decreasing with respect to the number of iterations,
and the convergence proof for the optimization problems
is given in [16, Appendix C]. To be self-contained, we
briefly provide the convergence analysis as follows. We can
see that the approximations of nonconvex constraints {(11),
(13c), (13d)} for problem (12) and {(11), (13c), (33c)} for
problem (32) satisfy properties of the IA method given in
[31]. This means that the proposed Algorithms 1 and 2 for
solving (27) and (38), respectively, generate the sequences
of non-decreasing objective values (i.e., R
LB,(i)
sec ≥ R
LB,(i−1)
sec
and Rˆ
LB,(i)
sec ≥ Rˆ
LB,(i−1)
sec ), which are upper bounded due to
the power constraints, leading to a monotonic convergence.
At each iteration, the achieved optimal solutions satisfy the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of (27) and (38), i.e.,
step 4 of Algorithms 1 and 2, respectively. By IA principle, the
KKT conditions of (27) and (38) are also identical to those of
(12) and (32), respectively, once the conditionsΨ(i) = Ψ(i−1)
(in Algorithm 1) and Ψˆ
(i)
= Ψˆ
(i−1)
(in Algorithm 2) are met
[31, Theorem 1].
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now evaluate the performance of the proposed schemes
using computer simulations in the MATLAB environment.
The key parameters are given in Table I. The ST, SR
and PR are assumed to locate at (0, 0, 0), (300, 0, 0) and
(0, 250, 0), respectively. We also assume that UAV flies from
the original location at (−100, 200, 100) to the destination
at (500, 200, 100). The other parameters are provided in the
captions of the figures. The convex solver SeDuMi is used to
solve the convex program.
The results obtained by Algorithms 1 and 2 are labeled
as “Proposed scheme (Alg. 1)” and “Proposed scheme (Alg.
2)”, respectively. For comparison purpose, we investigate three
other schemes:
• “Fixed power:” In every time slot, ST and UAV transmit
their signals with the fixed transmit powers, i.e., P¯S
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Fig. 4. Average secrecy rate versus time interval T , with perfect location
information of Eve.
and P¯U, respectively, and only the UAV’s trajectory is
optimized.
• “Straight line trajectory:” The UAV flies along the straight
line from the initial location to the final location, and only
the transmit power of ST and UAV is optimized.
• “No UAV-aided JN:” We set pU[n] = 0, ∀n (i.e., without
using UAV-aided JN), which corresponds to the tradi-
tional on-ground CRN.
The solutions of these schemes can also be obtained by using
Algorithms 1 and 2 after some slight modifications.
A. Numerical Results for Perfect Location Information of Eve
In this scenario, Eve is placed at (150, 250, 0), which is
closer to ST than SR. This unfair setting aims at demonstrating
the effectiveness of using UAV-aided JN.
In Fig. 4, the average secrecy rates of different schemes
are illustrated versus the time interval, T ∈ [0, 500s]. It is
not difficult to see that the average secrecy rate is always
less than or equal to zero in the case of “No UAV-aided
JN” scheme. The reason is that the ST-SR link has worse
channel quality than the ST-Eve link. This result verifies
the importance of using UAV-aided JN. The other important
observations from the figure are as follows. First, all schemes
provide the non-decreasing secrecy rates as T increases. This
is because the larger T the larger time for UAV to hover over
Eve to transmit JN more effectively. Second, from numerical
results of the average secrecy rates of “Straight line trajectory”
when compared to the “Proposed method (Alg. 1)” and “Fixed
power”, we can see that the UAV’s trajectory optimization is
highly important, since it can help UAV fly to an optimal
location to interfere with the ST-Eve channel. Third, the
proposed method always provides the best performance along
with T . Finally, the secrecy rate of the proposed scheme in
the 3D space is superior to that in the 2D space, and an
improvement of almost 2 Mbps is achieved at T = 400s.
The trajectories of UAV are depicted in Figs. 5(a) and 5(b)
for different schemes with T ∈ {80s, 260s, 500s} in both the
2D and 3D spaces. Except for “Straight line trajectory”, the
other schemes follow similar trajectories, since UAV aims
at emitting JN to jam Eve in a short distance (but keep far
away from SR to mitigate the interference caused by JN), as
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Fig. 5. Trajectories of UAV for different schemes with perfect location
information of Eve.
long as satisfying the PR’s interference power requirement.
Furthermore, the distances between Eve and UAV are defined
as a function of n in Fig. 6. Although the optimal UAV-Eve
distance is intuitively 100 m, UAV does not move to the point
above Eve directly. To maximize the average secrecy rate,
the UAV trajectory is optimized under a tradeoff between
the secrecy performance improvement and the amount of
undesired interference to SR and PR.
Fig. 7 depicts the secrecy rate of Algorithm 1 per time
slot with different values of T in both the 2D and 3D
spaces. One can see that the number of time slots having the
positive secrecy rate in the 3D space is much higher than
that in the 2D space, which demonstrates the effectiveness
of jointly optimizing the UAV’s altitude. This phenomenon
can be further confirmed by the results in Fig. 6, where the
number of time slots having the optimal UAV-Eve distance in
the 3D space is higher than that in the 2D space. Moreover,
the secrecy rates reduce to zero at the last time slots. This is
because UAV moves closer to SR than Eve at those time slots,
and thus, it must stop sending JN.
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B. Numerical Results for Imperfect Location Information of
Eve
We assume that Eve is located in a circular region centered
at (xE0 , yE0 , hE0) = (150, 250, 0) with the radius Q = 20 m.
The other simulation parameters are the same as before.
We plot the average secrecy rate versus the time interval
T in Fig. 8(a) and the secrecy rate of Algorithm 2 per time
slot with different values of T in Fig. 8(b). Unsurprisingly,
the secrecy rate of all schemes is degraded, when compared
to the case of perfect location information of Eve. Notably, the
performance gaps between 3D and 2D cases are even deeper.
In Fig. 8(a), at T = 400s, the performance gain of 3D over
2D is about 3.5 Mbps, compared to 2 Mbps in Fig. 4. These
results confirm the robustness of the proposed scheme against
the effect of imperfect location information of Eve. Fig. 9
illustrates the trajectories of UAV in the 2D and 3D spaces,
and we recall the discussions presented for Fig. 5.
In Fig. (10), we plot the secrecy rate as a function of Q ∈
[0, 40] m. We note that Q = 0 corresponds to the case of
perfect location information of Eve. It can be observed that
the average secrecy rate of all schemes drops quickly when
Q increases. The reasons for these results are two-fold: 1)
For a larger Q, Eve is able to move closer to ST to wiretap
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(a) Average secrecy rate versus the time interval T .
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Fig. 8. Secrecy rates with imperfect location information of Eve.
confidential messages more effectively; 2) The active region of
Eve becomes wider, and thus, the location information of Eve
is more difficult to estimate. In this case, the use of UAV-aided
JN becomes less effective. Nevertheless, the proposed scheme
still achieves the best secrecy rate by jointly optimizing the
transmit power and UAV’s trajectory in the 3D space.
C. Convergence Behavior of Algorithms 1 and 2
The convergence behavior of Algorithms 1 and 2 is shown in
Fig. 11, where the convergence condition is set as ǫtol = 10
−4.
One can see that that the proposed Algorithms monotonically
improve the secrecy rate after every iteration, since the op-
timization variables are adjusted to find a better solution for
next iterations. Intuitively, Algorithms 1 and 2 require only
about 8 iterations to obtain the maximum secrecy rates, which
are also typical for other settings.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper studied the optimization problems of maximizing
the average secrecy rate of the secondary system, where a UAV
is deployed to transmit JN for interfering the ST-Eve channel
in both perfect and imperfect location information of Eve. The
problems under the power constraints and the PR’s interference
power threshold are formulated as nonconvex optimization
problems. To address these problems, we first derive new
nonconvex problems but with more tractable forms, and then
apply IA-based method to develop low-complexity iterative
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Fig. 9. Trajectories of UAV for different schemes with imperfect location
information of Eve.
algorithms for their solutions. Numerical results confirmed
fast convergence of the proposed algorithms and significant
performance improvement over existing schemes. They have
also revealed that joint optimization of UAV’s altitude (in
3D space) provides robustness against the effect of imperfect
location information of Eve.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The worst-case secrecy rate can be written as
Rˆsec[n] = RS [n]− max
(∆x,∆y)∈Ξ
RE[n]. (39)
Similarly to (8) and (10), RS[n] and RE[n] can be safely
derived as
Rˆsec[n] = R
LB
S [n]− max
(∆x,∆y)∈Ξ
RUBE [n]
(
dˆSE, dˆUE[n]
)
, (40)
11
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Q (m)
A
v
er
ag
e
se
cr
ec
y
ra
te
(M
b
p
s)
3D-space 2D-space
Proposed scheme (Alg. 2)
Fixed power
Straight line trajectory
No UAV-aided JN
Fig. 10. Average secrecy rate of different schemes versus Q.
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Fig. 11. Typical convergence behaviors of Algorithms 1 and 2 for T = 500s.
where RLBS [n] is given in (8). Considering
(
dˆSE, dˆUE[n]
)
,
RUBE [n] in (10) can be rewritten as
RE [n] ≤ R
UB
E [n]
(
dˆSE, dˆUE[n]
)
= log2
(
1 +
γ0dˆ
−ϕ
SE pS [n]
γ0dˆ
−2
UE [n]pU[n] + 1
)
. (41)
Differently from the case of the perfect location information,
dˆSE is also an optimization variable of R
UB
E [n]. However, the
joint optimization with dˆSE will make the optimization problem
very complex. To reduce the complexity of the problem, a
supremum of RUBE [n]
(
dˆSE, dˆUE[n]
)
over dˆSE is considered as
RUBE [n]
(
d¨SE, dˆUE[n]
)
= sup
dˆSE∈D
RUBE [n]
(
dˆSE, dˆUE[n]
)
, (42)
where D is the set of distances from ST to Eve; d¨SE is
the shortest distance between ST and a possible location
of Eve, denoted by c¨E, such that c¨E ∈ C , {cˆE +
(∆xE,∆yE, 0)|(∆xE,∆yE) ∈ Ξ}. Notably, the expression in
(41) indicates that the supremum of RUBE [n]
(
dˆSE, dˆUE[n]
)
over
dˆSE can be obtained by finding the minimum distance of
dˆSE corresponding to d¨SE. In particular, based on geometric
property, c¨E can be easily determined as in Fig. 3, while
satisfying the condition in (42). Finally, d¨SE can be calculated
as d¨SE = fd(c¨E, cST).
We should note that dˆSE and dˆUE[n] are not independent of
the Eve’s location cˆE. This leads to the fact that the supremum
of RUBE [n]
(
dˆSE, dˆUE[n]
)
cannot be determined only over the
set of dˆSE. In addition, there is no basis to say that when
Eve is located at c¨E as shown in Fig. 3, we can obtain the
average worst-case secrecy rate. However, with a fixed point
c¨E, we can compute d¨SE ≡ mindˆSE∈D{dˆSE}, and then, obtain a
“strict” worst-case secrecy rate which provides an upper bound
of RUBE [n]
(
dˆSE, dˆUE[n]
)
regardless of a real location of Eve,
i.e., RUBE [n]
(
d¨SE, dˆUE[n]
)
≥ RUBE [n]
(
dˆSE, dˆUE[n]
)
. As a result,
the strict worst-case objective function is derived as in (31).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Constraint (36) can be rewritten as
(36)⇔


[
∆xE
∆yE
]T [
∆xE
∆yE
]
−Q2 ≤ 0, (43a)
fd(cˆE + (∆xE,∆yE, 0), cU[n]) ≤ αE [n] , (43b)
which is equivalent to the following constraints:
(43)⇔


[
∆xE
∆yE
]T [
∆xE
∆yE
]
−Q2 ≤ 0, (44a)
[
∆xE
∆yE
]T [
∆xE
∆yE
]
− 2
[
xU[n]− xˆE
yU[n]− yˆE
]T [
∆xE
∆yE
]
+fd(cˆE, cU[n])− αE[n] ≤ 0. (44b)
By introducing θE[n] such that
fd(cˆE, cU[n])− αE[n] ≤ θE[n], ∀n ∈ N , (45)
and applying S-procedure [30], [34] to (44), there exists
µ[n] ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N , (46)
such that
 1
(
xˆE − xU[n]
yˆE − yU[n]
)
(
(xˆE − xU[n]) (yˆE − yU[n])
)
θE[n]


 µ[n]
[
1 0
0 −Q2
]
. (47)
Although (47) is still intractable, we can apply Schur’s com-
plement [36] to transform (47) into the convex constraint as
 1 0 xˆE − xU[n]0 1 yˆE − yU[n]
xˆE − xU[n] yˆE − yU[n] θE[n]


 µ[n]

1 0 00 1 0
0 0 −Q2

 , (48)
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which is equivalent to
S[n] ,

 µ[n]− 1 0 xU[n]− xˆE0 µ[n]− 1 yU[n]− yˆE
xU[n]− xˆE yU[n]− yˆE −Q2µ[n]− θE[n]

  0.
(49)
It is true that constraints (45), (46) and (49) are convex, and
thus, the proof is completed.
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